William Lettig v. Scott V. Carver, Warden, Utah State Prison - Draper; M. R. Sibbett, Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons; Fred Trujillo, Hearing Officer for the Utah Boards of Pardons; and All Other Board of Pardons Members Not Presently Known to Petitioner : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
William Lettig v. Scott V. Carver, Warden, Utah
State Prison - Draper; M. R. Sibbett, Chairman of
the Utah Board of Pardons; Fred Trujillo, Hearing
Officer for the Utah Boards of Pardons; and All
Other Board of Pardons Members Not Presently
Known to Petitioner : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Debra J. Moore; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellees.
Rosemond Blakelock; Blakelock & Stringer; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, William Lettig v. Scott V. Carver, No. 940380 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6030
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM LETTIG, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
SCOTT V. CARVER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison - Draper; M. R. 
SIBBETT, Chairman of the Utah 
Board of Pardons; FRED 
TRUJILLO, Hearing Officer for 
the Utah Board of Pardons; 
and ALL OTHER BOARD OF 
PARDONS MEMBERS NOT PRESENTLY 
KNOWN TO PETITIONER, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
Case No. 940380-CA 
Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from a Final Order of 
Dismissal of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David 
Young presiding 
Rosemond Blakelock (6183) 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 East Center, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
Attorneys for Appellees 
t 
K F u 
So 
UTAH COURT OF 
BRIEF 
APPALS 
Gtdnt&o 
FILED 
MAR " 8 1995 
irrr ^ r * ^ ^ ^ ^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM LETTIG, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
SCOTT V. CARVER, Warden, Utah 
State Prison - Draper; M. R. 
SIBBETT, Chairman of the Utah 
Board of Pardons; FRED 
TRUJILLO, Hearing Officer for 
the Utah Board of Pardons; 
and ALL OTHER BOARD OF 
PARDONS MEMBERS NOT PRESENTLY 
KNOWN TO PETITIONER, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
Case No. 940380-CA 
Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from a Final Order of 
Dismissal of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David 
Young presiding 
Rosemond Blakelock (6183) 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 East Center, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the Case 3 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 4 
Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS BECAUSE LETTIG HAS 
FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THOSE FINDINGS 7 
POINT II: LETTIG SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO 
CHALLENGE THE JUDGMENT BELOW BASED 
ON INFORMATION NEVER BROUGHT TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ATTENTION 9 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT LETTIG FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
ANY DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
IN LETTIG'S POST-REVOCATION PAROLE 
GRANTING HEARING 13 
CONCLUSION 14 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992) 12 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 2, 8 
Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 
(Utah 1993) 4, 5 
Mever v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984) 12 
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994) 2, 13 
Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) 13 
Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), vacated on other grounds, 886 P.2d 508 
(Utah 1994) 13 
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994) 13 
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 2, 10 
State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) 12 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 8 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1995) 3, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1994) 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) & (2) (1994) 11 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (1994) 3, 11 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM LETTIG, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, : 
v. : 
SCOTT V. CARVER, Warden, Utah : 
State Prison - Draper; M. R. 
SIBBETT, Chairman of the Utah : Case No. 940380-CA 
Board of Pardons; FRED Priority No. 14 
TRUJILLO, Hearing Officer for : 
the Utah Board of Pardons; 
and ALL OTHER BOARD OF : 
PARDONS MEMBERS NOT PRESENTLY 
KNOWN TO PETITIONER, : 
Respondents-Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred on the Court of 
Appeals by section 78-2a-3 (2) (h) of the Utah Code, which grants 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs challenging Board of Pardons decisions, except 
cases involving a first degree or capital felony. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1994). This case involves Mr. Lettig's 
convictions of Theft, a second degree felony, and Failure to Stop 
at Officer's Command, a third degree felony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Lettig has waived any challenge to the trial 
court's findings by failing to marshal the evidence supporting 
those findings? 
Standard of Review; This Court has "shown no reluctance to 
affirm when the appellant fails adequately to marshal the 
evidence." Interiors Contracting. Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Whether, by failing to raise the issue below, Lettig 
waived any challenge to the trial court's judgment based on 
contents of the Board's file that Lettig now alleges were not 
previously disclosed to him? 
Standard of Review: Absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, this Court will not review a claim of error raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) . 
3. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed Lettig's 
petition for extraordinary writ where Lettig failed to demonstrate 
that the Board denied him any procedural protections in his post-
revocation parole grant hearing? 
Standard of Review; When reviewing the dismissal of a 
petition for extraordinary relief, the appellate court accords no 
deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal. 
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994). However, "while 
[the court] must review the fairness of the process by which the 
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Board undertakes its sentencing function, . . . [it] does not sit 
as a panel of review on the result.'" Id. 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are set forth in Addendum B to this Brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) (1995) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (1994) 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
David S. Young presiding, dismissing Lettig's petition for 
extraordinary relief against members of the Utah State Board of 
Pardons ("the Board"). Lettig, who was incarcerated on convictions 
of several second and third degree felony offenses, challenged the 
Board's decision to revoke his parole and not to set a new parole 
date, but to reconsider Lettig's case in September 1996. Lettig 
contended that the Board's decision improperly exceeded the Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the 
Board's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Board 
had sufficient cause to exceed the guidelines based upon Lettig's 
prior unsuccessful paroles and other considerations identified in 
the Board's written rationale. Lettig contends on appeal that the 
district court's findings are not supported by the record, that the 
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Board failed to disclose portions of the file to Lettig before the 
January 1994 rehearing, and that the trial court failed to 
adequately review the evidence on which the Board based its 
decision. In response, the Board urges this Court to affirm the 
district court's decision on the grounds (1) that Lettig has failed 
to properly marshal the evidence in challenging the trial court's 
findings, (2) that Lettig failed to raise below any concerns based 
on the alleged nondisclosure of the Board's file to him, and (3) 
that Lettig's claims of error fall outside the limited scope of 
judicial review of parole decisions. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Lettig commenced this action in November 1993, by filing a 
petition for extraordinary relief challenging the Board's August 
1993 decision to revoke Lettig's parole and to not reconsider 
Lettig for parole until September 1996. On December 14, 1993, the 
trial court ordered the Board to grant Lettig a new parole grant 
hearing in accordance with the procedural due process requirements 
established by the December 6, 1993 decision in Labrum v. Utah 
Board of Pardons, 870 P. 2d 902 (Utah 1993) . The Board reheard 
Lettig's case in January 1994, and reaffirmed its prior decision. 
Lettig then amended his petition to challenge the Board's January 
1994 decision. In April 1994, the court held an evidentiary 
hearing on Lettig's claims. On May 23, 1994, the court granted the 
Board's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Lettig's entire 
petition with prejudice. Lettig filed his notice of appeal on June 
4 
21, 1994. 
Statement of Facts 
In June 1993, Lettig was convicted of Failure to Stop at 
Officer's Command, a third degree felony, for which he was 
sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years. R. 197 (First 
Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief 1 3 & Exhibit A) . At the 
time he committed that offense, Lettig was on parole from the Utah 
State Prison for a May 1986 conviction of Theft, a second degree 
felony for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for one to 
fifteen years. R. 197 (First Amended Petition 1 5 & Exhibit B). 
In July 1993, based upon the recent felony conviction and 
several other admitted or uncontested parole violations, the Board 
revoked Lettig's parole from the Theft sentence. R. 282 (Findings, 
Conclusions and Final Order 111 8, 10) . The Board then decided not 
to consider Lettig for further parole until September 1996. R. 283 
(Findings 1 14) . In November 1993, Lettig filed a petition for 
"habeas corpus" challenging the Board's decision as exceeding the 
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines. R. 2-7. 
In December 1993, in Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 
902, 911 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Board 
must afford inmates timely disclosure of their files before 
conducting original parole grant hearings. Based upon the Labrum 
decision, the trial court ordered the Board to disclose its file to 
Lettig and rehear Lettig's case. R. 160-62. In January 1994, the 
Board provided Lettig a copy of its parole file in accordance with 
its interpretation of Labrum and reheard Lettig's case. R. 286 
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(Findings HU 32-33). Based on the rehearing, the Board reaffirmed 
its prior decision not to consider Lettig for parole until 
September 1996. R. 222. 
Lettig amended his petition to challenge the Board's new 
decision, again contending that the Board had improperly exceeded 
the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines. R. 196. In April 1994, 
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which it received in 
evidence the Board's original parole file and heard testimony from 
Board member Curtis Garner, parole officer James Furner, and 
Lettig, among others. R. 277. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered its 
findings and conclusions. The court found that Lettig's claims "go 
directly against the substance of the Board's ultimate parole 
decision, attacking the Board's ability to deviate from the 
guidelines in his case, not against the procedural protections 
afforded by the Board." R. 288. Concluding that the Board "had 
sufficient cause in this case to exceed those guidelines based upon 
Petitioner's prior paroles and other circumstances of his case that 
were identified by the Board in its written rationale," the court 
granted summary judgment for the Board. R. 289. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Lettig has failed to raise an appropriate issue for this 
Court's review. Lettig claims that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the trial court's findings, but has failed to marshal 
the evidence supporting those findings. Lettig complains that 
documents that were not disclosed to him before the evidentiary 
hearing below provided new or additional evidence to support his 
petition, but failed to raise that issue in the trial court. 
Finally, Lettig attacks the trial court for failing to adequately 
review the evidentiary basis for the Board's decision not to 
consider him for parole until September 1996. This attack, 
however, raises an issue outside the proper scope of judicial 
review of parole decisions, which extends only to the process by 
which parole decisions are made and does not reach the substance of 
those decisions. This Court should accordingly affirm the trial 
court's decision denying Lettig's petition for extraordinary 
relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS BECAUSE LETTIG HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE IN CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THOSE FINDINGS 
Lettig's contention that the trial court's findings are 
unsupported by the evidence should be rejected because Lettig has 
utterly failed to comply with this Court's marshaling requirement 
for challenges to the sufficiency of evidence. This Court has not 
hesitated to affirm a trial court's findings where the appellant 
has failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting the 
findings. "It is the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence, 
citing the appellate court to all the evidence in the record that 
would support the determination reached by the trial court and then 
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demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under 
attack." Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith 
Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
To properly marshal the evidence, "the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co. , 818 P. 2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in 
original). Thus, in Interiors Contracting, this Court declined to 
entertain a challenge to the trial court's findings concerning an 
estoppel claim where the appellant's briefs "merely re-emphasize[d] 
evidence it deem[ed] supportive of its position, while ignoring 
evidence supportive of the trial court's findings." 881 P.2d at 
933. 
Here, Lettig has made no pretense of marshaling the evidence 
in attacking the trial court's findings. In fact, Lettig's brief 
is nearly bereft of the record citations that would accompany an 
adequate marshaling effort. The only finding Lettig specifically 
attacks is Finding No. 40, which recounts the testimony of Board 
member Curtis Garner that the Board's decision was "affected by 
[Lettig's] . . . lack of remorse at the parole hearings." R. 287. 
Claiming that Garner's testimony actually contradicted this 
finding, Lettig selectively emphasizes portions of Garner's 
testimony, removes them from their context, and then ignores other 
portions of his testimony. Rather than testifying that Lettig was 
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remorseful, Garner acknowledged that Lettig expressed remorse, but 
indicated that he disbelieved those expressions, given Lettig"s 
record of several unsuccessful prior paroles. R. 363 (" [Al t prior 
hearings, [Mr. Lettig] displayed himself well, indicated 
appropriate remorse and so forth and as a result I think I, as the 
person conducting the hearing this time, tended to discount those 
things at this hearing." (emphasis added)). Moreover, Garner also 
testified that one of the aggravating factors for the Board's 
decision was Lettig's "minimization" of his responsibility for the 
incident that led to his conviction of evading arrest. R. 385. 
Certainly, the trial court could have reasonably interpreted this 
evidence as showing Lettig's "lack of remorse." 
Lettig has failed to marshal the evidence in support of his 
attack on Finding No. 40 or any other finding of the trial court. 
His failure to marshal the evidence thwarts appellate review of his 
claims. Therefore, this Court should reject Lettig's contention 
that the trial court's findings were inadequately supported by the 
evidence. 
II. 
LETTIG SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHALLENGE 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BASED ON INFORMATION NEVER 
BROUGHT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTENTION 
This Court should reject Lettig's attempt to overturn the 
trial court's judgment based on contents of the Board's file that 
Lettig now claims were not disclosed to him before the January 1994 
rehearing. As a general rule, Utah appellate courts "will not 
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consider an issue, raised for the first time on appeal, unless the 
trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (declining to review challenges initially raised on appeal to 
constitutional validity of statute and procedures by which 
defendant was convicted of exhibiting harmful material to a minor). 
Appellate courts normally decline to consider issues and 
arguments not raised below because the "trial court is considered 
'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing 
analysis of issues.'" Id. (quoting State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Moreover, "failing to argue an issue 
and present pertinent evidence in [the trial court] denies the 
trial court 'the opportunity to make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law' pertinent to the claimed error." State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d at 360 (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 
823 P.2d 479, 483 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
No plain error or exceptional circumstances exist to justify 
Lettig's failure to bring the allegedly undisclosed documents to 
the attention of the trial court. Lettig claims that he first had 
access to unspecified portions of his file when it was admitted 
into evidence at the April 1994 evidentiary hearing on his 
extraordinary writ petition.1 Assuming this is true, Lettig offers 
xLettig never specifically identifies what file contents he 
claims he first saw at or after the evidentiary hearing below. 
Attached to his brief, however, are two documents on which he 
apparently relies. Addendum B contains handwritten comments from 
a February 1992 parole hearing that characterize Lettig's conduct 
as "snivelling." Lettig contends this document evidences the 
Board's alleged animosity and prejudice toward him. While the 
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no explanation of why he failed to raise any concern about 
previously undisclosed file contents either immediately at the time 
of the hearing or even within a reasonable time after the hearing. 
Contemplating circumstances such as this, Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly confers discretion on the trial 
court to "open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment," Grounds for such action include " [a]ccident or 
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against" 
and "[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) (3) & 
(4) (1994). Cf^ Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) & (2) (1994) (court may 
set aside judgment on ground of "surprise" and "newly discovered 
comments may be offensive, their significance is highly 
questionable since the Board released Lettig on parole in November 
1992. Nevertheless, Lettig has waived this issue by failing to 
bring the document to the attention of the trial court via a Rule 
59 motion or otherwise. 
Addendum C contains "Board Action Routing Sheet" for Lettig's 
July 1993 revocation hearing, which Lettig claims inaccurately 
refers to his "sixth parole violation." Since Lettig admits this 
was his fourth parole revocation proceeding, and since he either 
admitted or failed to contest five separate parole violations at 
that proceeding alone, R. 282, it is difficult understand Lettig's 
objection. Lettig also contests the accuracy of the statement 
contained in Addendum C that Lettig placed citizens' lives in peril 
in the incident that led to his third degree felony conviction of 
Failure to Stop at Officer's Command. As discussed in Point III 
below, the issues of the accuracy of this statement and the impact 
it may have had on the Board's decision are outside the limited 
scope of judicial review of parole decisions. Even if such issues 
were within the appropriate scope of review, however, Lettig waived 
them by failing to raise them below. 
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evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)"). 
This Court is not the appropriate forum in which to make an 
initial determination of (1) whether Lettig in fact first 
discovered portions of his file at the April 1994 evidentiary 
hearing; (2) if so, whether Lettig could, with reasonable 
diligence, have obtained that evidence before the hearing; and (3) 
whether the alleged newly discovered evidence was "such as to 
render a different result probably on the retrial of the case." 
See State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (construing 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a) (4)) . See also Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 
1229, 1235 n.2 (Utah 1992) (stating trial court should have the 
first opportunity to consider whether to set aside judgment on Rule 
60(b) grounds); Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1984) 
(rejecting claim of surprise never brought to the attention of 
trial court by objection, motion to strike, motion for new trial or 
otherwise). 
Once the Board's file was received in evidence below, it 
remained available for review by Lettig and his counsel. Lettig 
failed to move the trial court for a new trial based on any 
previously undisclosed portions of the file and therefore waived 
any claim he may have had based on the allegedly undisclosed 
documents. This Court should reject Lettig's belated challenge to 
the trial court's judgment based on the allegedly undisclosed 
contents of the Board's file. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
LETTIG FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY DENIAL OF 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN LETTIG'S POST-
REVOCATION PAROLE GRANT HEARING 
Lettig's contention that the trial court erred in failing to 
adequately determine the basis of the Board's decision ignores the 
limited scope of judicial review of Board of Pardons decisions 
concerning parole. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
repeatedly emphasized that judicial review of Board of Pardons 
decisions 
is limited to the 'process by which the Board undertakes 
its sentencing function.' ' [W] e do not sit as a panel of 
review on the result, absent some other constitutional 
claim.' Furthermore, so long as the period of 
incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls 
within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g., 
five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual 
circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious. 
Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994) (quoting Lancaster 
v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)). See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1995) ("Decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles . . . are final and 
are not subject to judicial review."); Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 
1097, 1100 (Utah 1994); Preece v. House. 848 P.2d 163, 164 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994); 
Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Here, the Board decided to reconsider Lettig for parole in 
September 1996. That date was well within the March 2003 
expiration date for Lettig's indeterminate sentence of one to 
fifteen years for his second degree felony offense of Theft. 
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Lettig failed to present evidence to the trial court of any unusual 
circumstances warranting judicial review of the evidentiary basis 
of the Board's decision. Therefore, this Court should reject 
Lettig's claim that the trial court improperly failed to review the 
decision. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that Lettig 
failed to demonstrate any procedural due process violation in his 
post-revocation parole grant hearing should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Lettig has failed to marshal the evidence to enable proper 
appellate review of his claims that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the trial court's findings. Lettig has waived any 
challenge to the trial court's findings based on newly discovered 
contents of the Board's file by failing to bring the matter to the 
trial court's attention by Rule 59 motion or otherwise. Finally, 
in challenging the trial court for failing to adequately review the 
basis of the Board's decision, Lettig misconstrues the appropriate 
scope of judicial review. Lettig failed to demonstrate any 
procedural deficiency in the Board's proceedings and his petition 
for extraordinary writ was therefore properly denied. This Court 
should affirm the decision below in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S ^day of March, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DEBRA J.(jybORE ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM M. LETTIG# 
Plaintiff, 
V, 
SCOTT V. CARVER, et al.. 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
and FINAL ORDER 
Case No. 930906342 HC 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court on April 18, 
1994, for an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Petition for 
extraordinary relief. The Respondents were represented by Lorenzo 
K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, and Petitioner was present 
and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. The Court having taken 
testimony and evidence in this case, having been fully briefed by 
the parties, having carefully considered the facts and evidence of 
this case, and having heard the arguments, issued its final 
judgment. Based upon the above, the Court now makes the following 
findings: 
OOc'80 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner William M. Lettig is presently incarcerated at 
the Utah State Prison and serving two valid indeterminate sentences 
of imprisonment: the first for Theft, a second degree felony, and 
the second for Evading Arrest\Failure to Stop, a third degree 
felony. 
2. Prior to the sentences Petitioner is now serving, 
Petitioner was also serving sentences for the crimes of Carrying a 
Concealed & Dangerous Weapon, a third degree felony, Attempted 
Escape from Custody, a third degree felony, two separate charges of 
Attempted Robbery, a third degree felony, and Reckless Driving, a 
misdemeanor. 
3. On November 10, 1992, Petitioner was released from the 
Utah State Prison under a parole agreement signed by the Utah Board 
of Pardons and Parole (hereinafter "Board"). 
4. As a condition of that parole, Petitioner agreed to abide 
by all the terms and conditions of the parole agreement as set by 
the Board, including obedience to federal, state and local laws. 
5. This was Petitioner's fourth parole from the prison since 
his initial incarceration in December 1975; all prior paroles ended 
in revocation because Petitioner failed to abide by the parole 
agreements and continued criminal activity and misbehavior while on 
parole. 
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6. On July 21, 1993, Petitioner appeared before a single-
member panel of the Board for a fourth parole revocation hearing. 
7. Petitioner was represented by counsel at that time, and 
counsel participated throughout the revocation proceedings before 
the Board. 
8. At the hearing, Petitioner pled "guilty" to having 
violated four separate conditions of his parole agreement, 
including having been convicted of a new felony offense while on 
parole; Petitioner also pled "no contest" to a fifth parole 
violation allegation. 
9. Petitioner's counsel did not object to the Board's actions 
while conducting the hearing, and Petitioner submitted the case for 
the Board's final decision regarding revocation. 
10. The board member conducting the hearing issued an interim 
decision revoking Petitioner's parole and ordering that Petitioner 
be re-incarcerated at the prison based upon Petitioner's guilty 
pleas. 
11. Instead of giving Petitioner another parole date, the 
board member ordered that Petitioner's case be scheduled for 
rehearing in September of 1995 to consider the next possible parole 
date. 
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12. In addition to the above order, the board member issued 
a written rationale for his decision, and that rationale contained 
the reasons for giving a 1995 rehearing date. 
13. On August 3, 1993, the full Board came together at a 
regularly scheduled meeting and considered Petitioner's case and 
the interim decision of July 21, 1993. 
14. At that time, the Board adopted the interim decision to 
revoke Petitioner's parole date and to re-incarcerate him, but it 
modified the 1995 rehearing dated to be 1996. 
15. Petitioner was not present at that meeting, and no new 
evidence or testimony was taken or considered by the Board at that 
time. 
16. On November 2, 1993, Petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(c) and (e) 
(1993), challenging the actions and decisions of the Board. 
17. In that petition, Petitioner claimed that the Board had 
deprived him of his liberty by revoking his parole and ordering a 
rehearing for September of 1996 without an adequate explanation of 
its reasons for "denying parole and exceeding guidelines." 
18. Petitioner asserted that by exceeding the guidelines, the 
Board violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
United States Constitution and the analogous clause of the state 
constitution. 
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19. Petitioner also claimed that the guidelines created an 
expectation of parole (or liberty interest) under Utah law which is 
protected under the due process clauses of both the state and 
federal constitutions and that the Board violated his rights by 
exceeding those guidelines. 
20. Petitioner also claimed that the Board failed to allow 
Petitioner the right to present evidence in his behalf and that it 
failed to accept evidence in his favor at the parole revocation 
hearing. 
21. Petitioner also challenged the ultimate decision of the 
Board to grant him a 1996 rehearing; he did not claim that the 
Board had failed to provide him access to the Board's files or the 
information considered at the hearing. 
22. Petitioner requested that the court order "respondents to 
rehear petitioner's case and grant him parole within the stated 
Guidelines." 
23. On December 14, 1993, the case came before the court for 
a scheduled evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues pending 
before the court. 
24. At that hearing, Petitioner had no witnesses to call but 
instead offered a statement to the court raising issues that had 
never been raised and were not part of the record. 
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25. Petitioner did not refute the facts put forth by the 
Board but argued that the case of Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons. 
227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah, Dec. 6, 1993) , applied to his case and 
should be considered by the court. 
26. Prior to that date, the Labrum case was not in issue and 
was not briefed by the parties. 
27. Based upon discussion with the parties, the court 
concluded that Petitioner was entitled to a parole hearing on the 
new criminal conviction leading to the parole revocation hearing 
and Petitioner's recommitment. 
28. The court also concluded that the Labrum protections 
should be applied to that new hearing. 
29. The court ordered the Board to grant Petitioner a parole 
hearing to consider the possibility of a future parole date on the 
new conviction and to grant Petitioner access to his parole file in 
accordance with the Labrum decision. 
30. The court stated that the new hearing was not intended to 
affect Petitioner's prior guilty pleas before the Board or to 
modify the Board's determination to revoke Petitioner's previous 
parole date. 
31. The court's stated intention was that the Board hold an 
original parole-grant hearing (on Petitioner's new conviction) and 
to consider a possible early release date for that conviction. 
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32. Subsequently, the Board provided Petitioner a copy of its 
parole file, in accordance with its interpretation of the Labrum 
decision, and it reheard Petitioner's case. 
33. The new hearing took place on January 19, 1994, in 
accordance with the court's order, the stipulations of the parties, 
and R671 of the Utah Administrative Code (1993). 
34. Petitioner was present at the hearing and represented by 
his own counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. 
35. On March 7, 1994, this matter again came before the 
court, and Petitioner requested to amend his complaint against the 
Board. 
36. The Court granted Petitioner's motion to amend, over 
Respondents' objection, and ordered that the amended petition be 
filed on March 18, 1994. 
37. Respondents were ordered to file an answer to the amended 
petition by April 1, 1994, and the case was set for an evidentiary 
hearing to be conducted on April 18, 1994. 
38. On April 18, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was held in 
this matter, and at that time, the court heard testimony from 
numerous witnesses regarding the Board's procedural processes and 
actions in Petitioner's case. 
39. Curtis Garner, the board member who conducted the January 
1994 hearing, testified that the sentencing matrix contained in the 
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Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines is used to calculate minimum 
sentence terms and that numerous other factors must also be 
considered when setting a parole date. 
40. Mr. Garner testified that Board's decisions in this case 
were affected by Petitioner's prior convictions, the number of 
previous paroles and Petitioner's lack of remorse at the parole 
hearings. 
41. Mr. Garner testified that the Board routinely deviates 
from the guidelines and that the guidelines are only one of many 
factors used by the Board in determining an early-release date. 
42. Mr. Garner also testified that the Board does not feel 
bound by the guidelines but merely considers the guidelines as a 
recommendation, not the actual sentence of imprisonment. 
43. Witness James Furner, a parole officer for Adult 
Probation and Parole, testified that he never told Petitioner that 
he [Mr. Furner] intended to see Petitioner serve every year of his 
sentence. 
44. Mr. Furner also denied Petitioner's allegations of 
altering the condition of any weapons taken from Petitioner's home 
during or of any other improprieties in the supervision of 
Petitioner's case. 
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45. The court finds that Mr. Garner and Mr. Furner's 
testimonies were convincing, and that they did not demonstrate any 
animosity or bias toward Petitioner as alleged in the complaint. 
46. The court also finds that Petitioner has failed to prove 
that the Board acted inappropriately in this matter. 
47. The Board's entire records on Petitioner was introduced 
as an exhibit, and those records indicate that Petitioner has been 
paroled from his sentence of incarceration on at least four 
separate occasions. 
48. Petitioner testified that he did not dispute the fact 
that he violated his parole in this case or that the Board was 
authorized to revoke his parole based upon the five violations of 
the parole agreement. 
49. When asked what proceedings the Board could give him to 
make the hearing in his case more fair, Petitioner referred to the 
guidelines but did not identify any additional procedural 
protections that should be afforded by the Board. 
50. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner's claims in 
this case go directly against the substance of the Board's ultimate 
parole decision, attacking the Board's ability to deviate from the 
guidelines in his case, not against the procedural protections 
afforded by the Board. Based upon the above findings of fact, the 
court now makes the following conclusions: 
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Petitioner has failed to prove that the Board failed to 
perform an act required by law or that the Board has exceeded it 
jurisdiction or abused its discretion in this case. Indeed the 
records of the Board show that the Board acted within its authority 
under state and federal law and properly applied the guidelines in 
Petitioner's case. 
The court also concludes that the Board had adequate cause and 
justification to revoke Petitioner's parole, based upon his 
admitted violations of the parole agreement, and to deny him a 
parole date on the new crime of commitment, regardless of the 
guideline matrix. 
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner failed to 
establish that the Board violated his procedural due process rights 
under either state or federal law. The guidelines contained in the 
Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines are used as a tool to 
calculate minimum release dates, and the Board had sufficient cause 
in this case to exceed those guidelines based upon Petitioner's 
prior paroles and the other circumstances of his case that were 
identified by the Board in its written rationale. 
Furthermore, the court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 
prove or even establish that the Board has abused its discretion, 
exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform a duty required by 
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law. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a basis 
that would entitle him to the judicial relief requested in his 
amended petition. 
Based upon the above and the fact that Petitioner has failed 
to prove any wrongful conduct by the Respondents in this case, the 
court concludes that Petitioner's claims against the Respondents 
are without merit and should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Having made the foregoing findings and conclusions, the court 
makes the following order: 
FINAL ORDER 
1. Respondents' motion for judgment is hereby granted. 
2. The relief Petitioner seeks in his amended petition is 
denied as a matter of law. 
3. This case is dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Respondents' motion to seal the Board of Pardons' file 
and records from public disclosure is hereby denied. 
5. Respondents' counsel (in the presence of Petitioner's 
counsel or representative) is hereby granted permission 
of the court to take the Board of Pardons' file, which 
was admitted as evidence, from the court for the sole 
purpose of making a copy of that record. Upon completion 
of copying, the file shall be immediately returned to the 
court in its original condition and organization. 
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."^fer Dated this "2>%^5ay of May, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
rONORABLE DAVID^Sl YOUNG 
Third Distriatf_Ceairt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the '' —day of May, 1994, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, an exact copy of the attached 
(proposed and unsigned) Findings, Conclusions and Final Order to: 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
BLAKELOCK & STRINGER 
37 EAST CENTER #200 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
(Lbl hlf/Ar, 
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ADDENDUM B 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A 
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The 
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in 
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any 
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may 
designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed 
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other 
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's 
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, 
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission 
of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing 
in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders 
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have 
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider whether the persons have 
made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with 
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, 
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of 
sentence. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27«5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 2; 1988, ch. 
172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38, 
§ 102; 1994, ch. 13, § 33. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1983, ch. 53, § 3 repealed a former § 77-27-5 
(L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to per diem and 
expenses of board members, and enacted a new 
§ 77-27-5. 
Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1 repealed former 
A w o w n 1QA3 ch 53. S 3). relating to 
compensation and expenses of board, and en-
acted the present section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or dis-
trict" near the middle of Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" throughout the section and 
substituted "chair" for "chairperson" through-
out Subsection (1Kb). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq lease of others, 40 ALR3d 1181 
C.J.S. — 49 C J S Judgments §§ 574 to 584 Key Numbers. — Judgment •» 891 to 899 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or anv of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes, provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment* 
(1) Irregularity m the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror s competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59 F R C P of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606 
ground for new trial, Rule 61 
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